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BOOK REVIEW
LAw AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN A mCA. By William Letwin. New York: Ran-
dom House, 1965. Pp. xi, 304. $5.95.
This book, lest the title unintentionally be misleading, does not deal with
laws, regulations, and economic policy in general. Mr. Letwin concerns himself
with the problem of monopoly and the Sherman Antitrust Act. In a well-docu-
mented and lucid style of presentation, he proceeds from an investigation of
the legal foundations (chapter 2), to the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890
(chapter 3), to its administration (chapter 4), interpretation (chapters 5 and 6),
and modifications in 1914 (chapter 7).
The process of evolution of the antitrust laws, which culminated in 1914
with the passage of the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, has
been cast in the legal, political, and economic environment prevailing at the time.
As a result, the discussion of the underlying law and its effectiveness in cases
which since have become famous, e.g., Trans-Missouri,' Addyston Pipe,2 Northern
Securities,3 and Standard Oil,4 offers insights into the role of the political moti-
vation behind the enactment of the law.
The discussion of the legal foundation of the Sherman Act is interesting, but
unfortunately too limited. This discussion, and that of the subsequent decisions
rendered in the cases cited above, pertains to and indicates the importance of the
"rights to contract." A more systematic discussion of this concept-implied prop-
erty rights in general-and the consequent changes thereof, if there were such
changes, would have been welcomed.
Those who are generally interested in "law and economics" will find this
book worthwhile reading. The legal background of the Sherman Act is traced
to English Common Law as early as the Fourteenth Century. First, the author
points out that at least until the Nineteenth Century, monopolies were creatures
of law and special grants made to individuals by kings and others in "power,"
for the return of some benefit. None of the cases cited was the result of the free
play of the market or the nature of the technologies giving rise to the particular
industrial organization.
Second, the discussion of the cases that arose during the latter part of the
Nineteenth and the beginning of the Twentieth Century leads the author to
conclude that the Sherman Act was (a) ambiguous and (b) generally ineffective.
Experts in this field have arrived at the same conclusion basing their analysis
not only on the period studied by Mr. Letwin but also that since 1914. These
findings are especially illuminating in the face of a generally held belief that the
American economy has remained competitive due to the antitrust laws, a belief
that cannot be supported by the available evidence.
1. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
2. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
3. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
4. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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Mr. Letwin describes the nature of the dilemma that exists by the following
concluding sentences:
One can with some justice consider antitrust law as a device serving
above all to accelerate the natural decay of monopoly power. To accel-
erate the breakdown is desirable, for the community is sooner enabled to
benefit from lower prices. But, on the other hand, to accelerate the
breakdown by government action is not altogether desirable, for the
community suffers from higher taxes. Again, to accelerate the break-
down of monopoly is desirable because it destroys undue private power,
but to do so by government action may contribute unduly to the power
of government. One is left wondering, therefore, how to arrange matters
so that the costs of the solution do not exceed the costs imposed by the
unsolved problem.5
The question raised might involve subjective values, but it does not rest
there. Everyone, except the monopolist himself, may be against "monopoly,"
but the question of what particular alternative will achieve the goal of eliminat-
ing or reducing the effects of monopolies is subject to objective treatment. In this
context, it is important to distinguish "monopolies" that are said to arise from the
so-called decreasing cost situation ("natural monopoly") from those that are
artificially created by laws that restrict firm entry into the industry. Telephone,
gas, and electricity are examples of the first while the second category includes
taxi services, liquor stores, television and radio channels, and the medical pro-
fession.
In the United States the fields considered to be subject to decreasing costs
are generally regulated by a commission, e.g., the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC), the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), and the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC). The main objective of this policy has been to effect
lower prices for the services by constraining, among other things, the rate of
return on "capital." Investigations have cast doubt on the effectiveness of
regulation in bringing about lower prices for the services to consumers.
Strictly speaking, the restriction of access to markets in the fields that fall
under the second category is not based upon any intent to prevent the rise
(or to reduce the extent) of monopoly. Although one may find various reasons
given for such restrictions, one characteristic result of such policies has been the
enrichment of the existing producers of the services. Ironically enough, the
enrichment has at times aroused the commission's indignation. A case in point
is the 1960 Congressional probe into the television network monopoly. Consider
an extreme example. If one person has the only television station, for example in
Austin, and the FCC will not issue additional television broadcasting licenses to
anyone else, we would expect (1) the station to be more profitable than other-
wise and (2) the holder of the license to have a hard time arguing effectively
that he was competing actively with another television station.
Even if the problems were defined correctly, it would be fair to say that in
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general the-choice of the "solution" has not been based on the accomplished
results of a regulatory device. It might perhaps be considered obvious that the
final results will be determined by the institutional arrangement used, and that
the choice among them will have to be guided by the knowledge and the
comparison of the results. But this notion, perhaps trivial, is uniquely absent in
matters relating to economic policies.
Thus, the decisions pertaining to efficient working of economic institutions in
general and the problem of monopoly in particular, cannot ignore the fact that
(1) the laws have not been effective and (2) a by-product of "Commissions" has
been to create and nurture monopolies rather than to reduce them. The decision
may, therefore, legitimately involve the choice of living with a deficiency (if it
exists) if the attempt to accelerate the deterioration of the monopoly by "Com-
missions" in fact prolongs the life of the monopolist. In a nutshell, one has to
ascertain, everything else being equal, whether a monopolist dies a quicker death
at the hand of technological change than at that of laws and regulations.
JoRA R. MiNASiAN
Associate Professor of Economics
State University of New York at
Buffalo
